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ABSTRACT 
Financial transfers from richer members to the poorer ones are a necessary tool for creating commitment to a 
regional integration project, especially from countries that have less potential to benefit economically from 
the process, as the case of EU shows. Since 2004, MERCOSUR has a mechanism for reducing asymmetries, 
the FOCEM, which is also a form of development aid and South-South cooperation. Brazil, the largest 
economy of MERCOSUR, accounts for 70% of the resources, while Paraguay, the least developed country, 
is entitled to 48% of annual payments. The aim of the paper is to evaluate how the fund has worked. The 
data collected show that FOCEM has become representative in relation to the GDP of Paraguay, its main 
beneficiary, and to the amount of development aid granted by Brazil, its main contributor. At the same time, 
the fund faces serious institutional challenges, as the MERCOSUR itself. 
 
Key words: FOCEM; regional asymmetries; MERCOSUR; South-South cooperation; financial international 
transfers. 
 
 
 
La reducción de las asimetrías en MERCOSUR como una forma de 
ayuda al desarrollo y de cooperación Sur-Sur: el caso del FOCEM 
 
RESUMEN 
Las transferencias financieras de miembros ricos a pobres son una herramienta necesaria para crear com-
promiso con un proyecto de integración, especialmente por parte de los países que tienen menos potencial 
para beneficiarse del proceso, como muestra el caso de UE. Desde 2004, MERCOSUR tiene un mecanismo 
para la reducción de asimetrías, el FOCEM, que también es una forma de ayuda al desarrollo y de coopera-
ción Sur-Sur. Brasil, la economía más grande del bloque, aporta el 70% de los recursos, mientras que 
Paraguay, el país menos desarrollado, tiene derecho a 48% de los pagos anuales. El objetivo del artículo es 
evaluar cómo el fondo ha actuado. Los datos recolectados muestran que FOCEM se ha vuelto significativo 
en relación al PNB de Paraguay, su principal beneficiario, y al montante de ayuda al desarrollo de Brasil, su 
principal contribuyente. Al mismo tiempo, el fondo enfrenta serios desafíos institucionales, como el propio 
MERCOSUR. 
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A redução das assimetrias no MERCOSUL como uma forma de ajuda 
ao desenvolvimento e cooperação Sul-Sul: o caso do FOCEM 
 
RESUMO 
As transferências financeiras de membros ricos a pobres são uma ferramenta necessária para criar compro-
misso com um projeto de integração, especialmente por parte dos países que têm menos potencial para se 
beneficiar do processo, como mostra o caso da UE. Desde 2004, o MERCOSUL tem um mecanismo para a 
redução de assimetrias, o FOCEM, que também é uma forma de ajuda ao desenvolvimento e de cooperação 
Sul-Sul. O Brasil, a maior economia do bloco, contribui com 70% dos recursos, enquanto que o Paraguai, o 
pais menos desenvolvido, tem direito a 48% dos pagamentos anuais. O objetivo do artigo é avaliar como o 
fundo tem atuado. Os dados reunidos mostram que o FOCEM se tornou significativo em relação ao PIB do 
Paraguai, seu principal beneficiário, e ao montante de ajuda ao desenvolvimento do Brasil, seu principal 
contribuinte. Ao mesmo tempo, o fundo enfrenta sérios desafios institucionais, como o próprio MERCOSUR.  
 
Palavras-chave: FOCEM; assimetrias regionais; MERCOSUL; cooperação Sul-Sul; transferências financei-
ras internacionais. 
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Introduction 
 
Financial resource transfers from richer to poorer countries are a political tool used 
to foster the commitment with a regional integration arrangement conformed by 
voluntary decision, convincing member States of the benefits of the process, espe-
cially in the case of countries who initially have little to gain from integration. 
The adoption of policies aimed at reducing asymmetries is not justified merely 
by the existence of inequalities (Giordano, Moreira and Quevedo, 2004). The rea-
son for the transfers is the necessity to counterweight the structural imbalances 
between countries, so that the benefits of the integration are fairly distributed 
among the participants, and also to take into account in the decision making process 
the negative effect that is originated from the asymmetries. By addressing the 
disparities, an integration process may contribute to the production of enduring 
benefits throughout the region and the member States, thus reinforcing the govern-
ments’ commitment to the integration itself. 
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Solidarity and internal cohesion are not the only motivations. Dealing the 
asymmetries’ problem is also related to the level of integration that can be achieved. 
The incapacity to reduce inequalities hampers, or even derails a more ambitious 
integration process (Bouzas, 2005). 
The asymmetries may be either structural or between policies. The first originate 
from factors that condition the State’s capacity of reaping benefits from the integra-
tion process, such as the economic dimension, the quality of the institutions and the 
level of socioeconomic development. The second relate to differences in social 
preferences and in institutional characteristics, and are a result of lack of coordina-
tion and convergence in rules and policies. 
The structural factors responsible for asymmetries can only change slowly over 
time, and may become a serious obstacle preventing a member State from profiting 
from the integration process. To deal with such disparities, there are preferential 
treatment mechanisms in the trade regime and financial transferences. 
In the case of policy asymmetries, there can be macroeconomic regional conse-
quences in resource allocation that, in turn, may generate loss of efficiency and 
interfere with integration. Coordination and rule and policy conversion are strate-
gies aimed at reducing these disparities, but they can be just as deal with than 
structural asymmetries, because they require inherently unstable compromises and 
the abdication of autonomy over national policy, which may be in conflict with the 
member States’ goals (Bouzas, 2005). 
This paper will concentrate on the financial transference mechanisms that deal 
with structural asymmetries problems in the MERCOSUR (Mercado Común del 
Sur - South Common Market) and, more precisely, will analyze the FOCEM 
(Fondo para la Convergencia Estructural del MERCOSUR - Fund for Structural 
Convergence of MERCOSUR), which was created in 2004 but started functioning 
only in 2006, after the conclusion of its incorporation process to the national legis-
lations. As Venezuela became a full member of the MERCOSUR in 2012, it was 
decided to promote until the end of 2013 a reformulation of the proportions of 
contributions to FOCEM and benefits received that correspond annually to each 
member State, to reflect the new situation. This article evaluates the fund taking 
into account its original rules and the data relating to the four founding members of 
MERCOSUR. 
Brazil, in 2010, had 79.45% of MERCOSUR’s population, 83.33% of its GDP 
and 71.68% of its territory, proportional to the totals of the four countries that 
composed the MERCOSUR in the occasion (see table 1). Together, Paraguay and 
Uruguay account for 3.99%, 2.27% and 4.90%. On the other hand, per capita in-
come in Brazil was inferior to Uruguay’s in almost US$ 1,000 in that year. Compar-
ing the countries with biggest and lowest per capita income, Uruguay has 4.21 times 
the value of Paraguay’s. 
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Table 1. Population, income and territorial disparities (in proportion of the total) 
 
 Population in 2010 GDP in 2010 
GDP per capita 
in 20101 Territory 
Argentina 16.56% 14.40% 9,088.90 23.41% 
Brazil 79.45% 83.33% 10,961.90 71.68% 
Paraguay 2.62% 0.71% 2,832.60 3.42% 
Uruguay 1.37% 1.56% 11,940.90 1.48% 
SOURCES: CEPAL and CIA World Factbook 
 
This paper aims to show that the resource allocation made through FOCEM has 
become significant to MERCOSUR’s smallest economies, especially Paraguay. 
Besides the impact on internal cohesion and the evolution of MERCOSUR, re-
source transference through a mutual fund may be seen as a way to foster develop-
ment in a South-South perspective. FOCEM becomes more relevant to the analysis 
because it is an initiative aimed at reducing asymmetries in an intergovernmental 
process, unlike the case of the EU (European Union), which uses its structural and 
social cohesion funds for a longer time and has more supranational components. 
This paper will do a thorough evaluation of the FOCEM, starting by its struc-
tures and rules. Afterwards, we will present a data series on annual fund budgets, 
comprised by the distribution of its resources by programs and countries and a 
funded project analysis. Based on these elements, conclusions will be formulated 
and presented at the end. 
 
 
1. Structure and rules 
 
FOCEM was created by Decision nº 45/042 of the CMC (Consejo Mercado Común 
- Common Market Council), and was structured by CMC’s Decision nº 18/05. Its 
first statute was put forward in CMC’s Decision nº 24/05, which was substituted by 
CMC’s Decision nº 01/10, establishing a new statute. 
The fund’s structure is composed by: (1) The CA-FOCEM (Consejo de Adminis-
tración del FOCEM - Administrative Council of FOCEM), which coincides to the 
GMC (Grupo Mercado Común - Common Market Group), formulates the fund’s 
directives and evaluates its performance. (2) The UTF (Unidad Técnica FOCEM - 
FOCEM’s Technical Unit), connected to the SM (Secretaría del MERCOSUR - 
Secretary of MERCOSUR), and in charge of evaluating and directly supervising the 
____________ 
 
1 Absolute values in current US dollars. 
2 The final part of the number refers to the year of the Decision. 
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projects. It is headed by an executive coordinator and has its own permanent staff, 
whose nationalities is, whenever possible, distributed through the member countries, 
hired through a competitive selection process, with the exception of the coordinator, 
who is nominated by the CMC and has a two year mandate, with one possible re-
election. (3) A UTNF (Unidad Técnica Nacional FOCEM - FOCEM’s National 
Technical Unit) in each member State. These units coordinate the internal tasks for 
selecting, presenting and supervising the projects, and also serve as a connection 
between the UTF and the countries (see table 2). 
 
 
Table 2. The institutional structure of FOCEM 
 
CMC (Consejo Mercado Común) 
 
CA-FOCEM (Consejo de Administración del 
FOCEM), which actually is the GMC (Grupo 
Mercado Común) 
 
UTF (Unidad Técnica FOCEM) SM (Secretaría del MERCOSUR) CRPM (Comisión de Repre-
sentantes Permanentes del 
MERCOSUR) 
 
UTNF (Unidad Técnica Nacional 
FOCEM) of each member State 
 
Executive organism of the projects 
SOURCE: Author’s elaboration 
 
The executive organism, the member States’ bureaucracy, the director of the SM, 
the CRPM (Comisión de Representantes Permanentes del MERCOSUR - Perma-
nent Representative Commission of MERCOSUR) and the CMC also perform tasks 
related to the FOCEM. The executive organism, which needs to be part of the 
public sector, is the agency designated by the awarded State to be responsible for 
executing the project; members of the State’s bureaucracy is made available to the 
UTF to help it supervise the execution of a project; the SM’s director hires external 
auditing, contributing with a report on the UTF’s annual budget, and presents the 
CMC with a summary of the member States’ quota payments to the MERCOSUR 
and to FOCEM, when new projects are being evaluated; CRPM is the agency 
responsible for receiving the projects from each UTNF and decides which ones are 
eligible to be considered by the UTF for funding, prepares reports to the GMC on 
the projects approved by the UTF and its general budget proposal, elaborates in-
structions and proposals for change in rules and regulations regarding the fund’s 
structure, and serves as an judicatory body to solve questions arising from the 
fund’s statutes; the CMC is responsible for final decisions on projects and the 
funds’ budget. 
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As in the case of MERCOSUR itself, the institutional structure of FOCEM com-
bines officials of exclusive dedication, who are concentrated in UTF, and represent-
atives of national governments. While the presence of officials of exclusive dedica-
tion in UTF, which is the organ responsible for the fund executive tasks, can enable 
greater agility, the representatives of national governments in GMC and CMC are 
who takes the final decisions, which can create difficulties for the administration 
and operation of FOCEM. 
Project evaluation and final approval follows a complex process. It starts at the 
UTNF of the country who proposed the project. The UTNF, than, makes the first 
selection and presents the project to the CRPM, which attests to its eligibility and 
advances it to the UTF. It is in this moment that the most rigorous evaluation takes 
place. The projects that advance this phase return to the CRPM, that forwards its 
evaluation and also the UTF’s to the GMC. Finally, the GMC submits all the docu-
ments to the CMC, which has the final decision. Proponents and the agencies re-
sponsible for the management of the project must be from the public sector, but it is 
not required that they are drawn only from the federal entities. States, provinces or 
municipalities may also ask for funds from the FOCEM, without the need of media-
tion from federal authorities. 
Priority definition on the destination of resources is based in two criteria: the 
size of the economy and the level of development. This is necessary because at the 
same time that the levels of the economies are hugely different, the country with the 
biggest economy, Brazil, has internal sub-regions that fare the worst among the 
MERCOSUR’s. 
Therefore, article 1 of the CMC’s Decision nº 18/05 establishes that FOCEM “is 
destined to finance programs to promote structural convergence; develop competi-
tive edges; promote social cohesion, particularly in the small economies and less 
developed regions; and support the institutional structure’s functioning to strength-
en the integration process as a whole”3 [own translation]. 
The amount yearly designated to FOCEM is US$ 100 millions, with 70% com-
ing from Brazil, 27% coming from Argentina, 2% coming from Uruguay and 1% 
coming from Paraguay. In the yearly distribution of resources for three of the four 
existing programs, to which one adds the non-allocated resources in previous years, 
Paraguay has the right to 48%, Uruguay to 32% and Argentina and Brazil to 10% 
each. The fund may also receive spontaneous contributions from member States, 
non-member States and international organizations. 
____________ 
 
3  CMC’s Decision nº 18/05, available in URL 
<http://www.mercosur.int/focem/archivo.php?a=717e7f827d7184798671307d71828a7f30424041413f42404
0453f7475736f4041483d424040456f75836f76756f797e848976857e73767f73757d89767f8284717c7583848
27384797e838479843e80747671010&x=k1k109f&y=6767006>, accessed on April 30, 2012. 
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Since we are not talking about loans to the beneficiaries, the resources are non-
refundable. The counterpart of the State that benefits from the fund transfer is to 
shoulder at least 15% of the project’s eligible expenditure, which may not be substi-
tuted by other expenses on ongoing projects or even infrastructure related moneys 
in the benefited territorial unity. A company may provide goods or services if its 
headquarters are in one of the member States. 
The FOCEM programs are: (1) Structural Convergence, designed to promote 
development, structural adjustment and interconnect systems of smaller economies 
and less developed regions. This program was given top priority in the first four 
years, in order to enhance infrastructure and foster integration. (2) Competitiveness 
Development, aimed at promoting more competitiveness of the internal production, 
through projects that enhance regional commerce, integrate the production chain, 
strengthen quality control and develop new products and processes. (3) Social 
Cohesion, with the goal of social development, especially in border areas, and may 
include common interest projects in the areas of health, poverty alleviation and 
employment policies. (4) Strengthening Institutional Structure and Integration 
Process, designed to better the functioning of MERCOSUR’s institutional frame-
work, under the responsibility of the SM. 
In some of the cases covered in the Competitiveness Development Program, 
FOCEM’s statute states that “the structuring, operation and/or management of 
projects [...] may be delegated to either public or public-private, or private institu-
tions that are part of the public direct or indirect administration, or the operating 
system of the member State, preserving the State’s responsibility for the manage-
ment of the project as a whole”4 [own translation]. These institutions may also 
shoulder total or partial execution of the project, earning the resources directed to 
the member State. The cases where this private participation is authorized are 
“R&D directed at dynamic productive sectors”; “development of production chains 
in dynamic and differentiated economy sectors”; and “conversion, increase and 
structuring of small and micro companies, their attachment to regional markets and 
the promotion and development of new ventures” [own translation]. 
The preclusion from private companies being completely in charge of projects 
contradicts the current objective of promoting competitive edges in the internal 
production capabilities of MERCOSUR’s countries (Souza, Oliveira and Gonçalves, 
2011). If the private sector could directly submit their projects and be responsible 
for the application of the resources, the chances of success in promoting regional 
competitive edges would be increased. 
____________ 
 
4  CMC’s Decision nº 1/10, available in URL: 
<http://www.mercosur.int/focem/archivo.php?a=222f30332e22352a3722e02e22333b30e0f2f0f1f1eff2f0f1f0
ef25262420f0f0f1edf2f0f1f02026342027263333f1203326282d222e262f3530e0273024262eee312527220c0
&x=cfcf06e&y=ffff09e>, accessed on April 30, 2012. 
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The percentage of annual resource distribution refers to the three main programs, 
whose projects are executed by a single country, since there is also the possibility of 
joint-country projects. The fourth is the SM’s responsibility and may not receive 
more than 0.5% of the annual FOCEM’s budget. Furthermore, there are no differen-
tiated distribution percentages to member States, according to the program.  
Fixating annual FOCEM resource percentages was a political decision pushed 
forward by Brazil (Souza, Oliveira and Gonçalves, 2011). Instead of opting for 
criteria to measure the asymmetry between MERCOSUR’s member States in dif-
ferent areas, Brazil preferred to establish fixed percentages, as a way to display 
political will and enhance equilibrium in the distribution of benefits from the inte-
gration process. 
 
 
2. Operating FOCEM 
 
Since its debut in 2006, FOCEM produced a collection of 39 projects, either ap-
proved, in execution or concluded, with a total contribution of US$ 835,713,555 
(see table 3). If we include the counterpart made to the projects directly by the 
States, the value sums up to US$ 1,134,102,407. The amount for each full year 
since 2006 was US$ 167,142,711. The Structural Convergence Program is respon-
sible for most of these resources, as well as the number of projects approved. 
 
 
Table 3. Project distribution (by program numbers and by resources in US$) 
 
 Projects Contribution from FOCEM 
Local 
contribution Total 
Structural  
Convergence 17 742,416,156 268,432,789 1,010,848,945 
Competitiveness 
Development 11 45,878,794 12,118,874 57,997,668 
Social  
Cohesion 8 47,247,705 17,837,189 65,084,894 
Strengthening 
Institutional Structure 3 170,900 0 170,900 
Total 39 835,713,555 298,388,852 1,134,102,407 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
Even if FOCEM’s minimal annual budget is fixed, its values have been increas-
ing since 2009 (see table 4). That comes both from leftover resources from previous 
years, as well as voluntary contributions made by Brazil in 2011 and 2012, which 
amounted to US$ 505,600,000. These extra contributions are due to negotiations 
between Brazil and Paraguay over the Itaipu power-plant, and are directed at the 
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construction of a 500 kV power line between Itaipu and Villa Hayes, an energy 
substation in the Paraguayan town and the extension of the substation at the right 
side of Itaipu, to take more electricity to Paraguay’s capital, Asunción. For these 
reasons, the fund’s budget has increased 41.14% from 2010 to 2011. Without the 
impact of voluntary transfers from Brazil, the increase has also been substantial 
(32.63%) between 2009 and 2010. 
 
 
Table 4. Budget (in thousand US$) 
 
2009 
Contribution Unallocated resources 
Non-utilized 
resources Interests
Non-utilized 
defrayal Reserves Total 
100,000 116,979 85,240 143 326 0 302,688 
2010 
Contribution Unallocated 
resources 
Non-utilized 
resources Interests
Non-utilized 
defrayal Reserves Total 
100,000 189,247 101,402 473 345 10,000 401,467 
2011 
Contribution Unallocated resources 
Non-utilized 
resources Interests
Non-utilized 
defrayal Reserves Total 
305,600 251,016 114,362 804 349 10,000 682,131 
2012 
Contribution Unallocated resources 
Non-utilized 
resources Interests
Non-utilized 
defrayal Reserves Total 
400,000 200,530 176,588 521 637 10,000 788,276 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
If the budget has increased each year, so has the leftover resources from previ-
ous years. If we add non-allocated and non-utilized resources from previous years, 
the values increase for all four countries in almost every year since 2009 (see table 
5). 
The only exception is Paraguay, which managed to retain less non-allocated and 
non-utilized resources in the 2012 budget, compared to 2011. The reason is a signif-
icant reduction of its non-allocated resources, which fell from US$ 92,642,996 in 
2011 to US$ 39,365,728 in 2012. 
 
 
 
 
 
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho The Reduction of Asymmetries in MERCOSUR 
 
Geopolítica(s) 
2013, vol. 4, núm. 1, 43-62 
52
Table 5. Leftovers from previous years (in US$) 
 
 2009 
Non-allocated Non-utilized Total 
Argentina 17,690,564 1,393,874 19,084,438 
Brazil 16,940,264 1,938,807 18,879,071 
Paraguay 27,865,716 70,081,629 97,947,345 
Uruguay 54,053,565 11,826,129 65,879,694 
 2010 
Non-allocated Non-utilized Total 
Argentina, 26,949.589 1,726,349 28,675,938 
Brazil 17,044,989 11,584,082 28,629,071 
Paraguay 58,880,963 80,223,792 139,104,755 
Uruguay 85,441,890 7,867,953 93,309,843 
 2011 
Non-allocated Non-utilized Total 
Argentina 33,425,843 4,317,628 37,743,471 
Brazil 18,596,597 19,192,874 37,789,471 
Paraguay 92,642,996 74,752,677 167,395,673 
Uruguay 105,850,365 16,098,515 121,948,880 
 2012 
Non-allocated Non-utilized Total 
Argentina 32,636,245 11,861,553 44,497,798 
Brazil 15,536,730 29,187,256 44,723,986 
Paraguay 39,365,728 108,389,427 147,755,155 
Uruguay 112,491,259 27,149,828 139,641,087 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
In relation to the variation, Paraguay, who had a 29.59% increase in its leftover 
resources between 2009 and 2010, got to 2012 with a 13.29% leftover decrease 
when compared to 2011 (see table 6). In the case of the other three countries, there 
was an increase in every year. The most expressive ones were in 2010, with a 
34.06% for Brazil. Since then, the augments have been less and less, which, associ-
ated with Paraguay’s reduction in 2012, may indicate two things: that a project 
elaboration learning process has occurred; and that there has been an increasing 
interest from the sub-national political entities of the member States for FOCEM’s 
resources. 
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Table 6. Leftovers from previous years (variation in %) 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
Argentina 33.45% 24.02% 15.18% 
Brazil 34.06% 24.24% 15.50% 
Paraguay 29.59% 16.90% -13.29% 
Uruguay 29.40% 23.48% 12.67% 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
Since Paraguay has the right to the biggest share of FOCEM’s resources each 
year, it is also responsible for the biggest leftovers (see table 7). The only year 
where another country came close to Paraguay was 2012, when Uruguay was 
responsible for 37.03% of the leftovers, against 39.18% from Paraguay. 
 
 
Table 7. Leftovers from previous years (in proportion of the total) 
 
 20095 20105 20115 20125 
Argentina 9.44% 9.87% 10.33% 11.80% 
Brazil 9.34% 9.85% 10.34% 11.86% 
Paraguay 48.44% 47.86% 45.81% 39.18% 
Uruguay 32.58% 32.10% 33.38% 37.03% 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
The amount of resources for projects followed the trend of increase seen in 
budget and leftover resources. Adding available and applied resources, the values 
increased for the four countries in all the years (see table 8). If we separate, in the 
analysis, the evolution of resources available from the evolution of resources used 
in projects, we can see an improvement in the countries’ efficiency of exploring 
FOCEM. Up until 2010, member States usually had more resources available than 
applied. From 2011 forward, the situation changes, and the resources applied start 
to overcome the sum available in the yearly budget. Paraguay is the most extreme 
case. From the amount of resources reserved for the country in 2012, 99.57% were 
directed to projects in execution. The exception is Argentina, who had more re-
sources available than executed in the whole period. 
____________ 
 
5 There are also leftovers from the Strengthening Institutional Structure Program, under the responsibility of 
the SM. 
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Table 8. Project resources (in US$) 
 
 2009 
In Execution Available Total 
Argentina 1,884,849 26,949,589 28,834,438 
Brazil 2,584,082 26,044,989 28,629,071 
Paraguay 86,845,382 58,851,963 145,697,345 
Uruguay 12,187,804 85,441,890 97,629,694 
 2010 
In Execution Available Total 
Argentina 2,278,374 36,240,587 38,518,961 
Brazil 17,178,707 21,293,387 38,472,094 
Paraguay 86,889,177 100,542,811 187,431,988 
Uruguay 8,335,478 117,097,720 125,433,198 
 
2011 
In Execution Available Total 
Argentina 12,941,915 34,736,507 47,678,422 
Brazil 30,407,812 17,316,610 47,724,422 
Paraguay 377,753,317 43,177,307 420,930,624 
Uruguay 80,279,040 73,604,791 153,883,831 
 2012 
In Execution Available Total 
Argentina 19,260,593 32,506,228 51,766,821 
Brazil 33,052,851 18,940,157 51,993,008 
Paraguay 482,401,854 2,069,307 484,471,161 
Uruguay 106,948,318 57,010,045 163,958,363 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
In the variation between the years, Paraguay accounts for the most notable in-
crease in resources available, in 2011, comparing with 2010, reaching up to 55.47%, 
which is due to Brazil’s increase in voluntary transferences (see table 9). In general, 
with the exception of the Paraguay case in 2011, growth has been slowing. 
 
 
 
 
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho The Reduction of Asymmetries in MERCOSUR 
 
Geopolítica(s)  
2013, vol. 4, núm. 1, 43-62 
55 
Table 9. Project resources (variation in %) 
 
 2010 2011 2012 
Argentina 25.14% 19.21% 7.90% 
Brazil 25.58% 19.39% 8.21% 
Paraguay 22.27% 55.47% 13.11% 
Uruguay 22.17% 18.49% 6.14% 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
The proportion of resources reserved to member States for projects in 2009 and 
2010 adjust themselves to what is prescribed in the FOCEM’s statute, with small 
variations in relation to the percentages established, since resources destined to 
Strengthening Institutional Structure Program were taken into account, as well as 
the resources used in projects that had the participation of two or more countries 
(see table 10). In 2011 and 2012, percentages are different than those established by 
the statute, because of Brazil’s voluntary transfers. With these contributions includ-
ed, Paraguay increased his participation to 64.36% of total resources for projects in 
2012’s budget. 
 
 
Table 10. Project resources (in proportion of the total) 
 
 20096 20106 20116 20126 
Argentina 9.55% 9.86% 7.11% 6.88% 
Brazil 9.48% 9.84% 7.11% 6.91% 
Paraguay 48.27% 47.96% 62.76% 64.36% 
Uruguay 32.34% 32.09% 22.94% 21.78% 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
The growth in the volume of resources for projects is also reflected in the GDP 
of the member States, especially in the case of Paraguay, the smallest 
MERCOSUR’s economy. FOCEM’s resources accounted for 1.0192% of Para-
guay’s GDP in 2009, and 1.7514% in 2011 (see table 11). In the case of Uruguay - 
the other small economy of MERCOSUR - FOCEM still accounts for only 0.5% of 
the country’s GDP. 
 
____________ 
 
6 There are also available resources for the Strengthening Institutional Structure Program, under the respon-
sibility of the SM, and for joint-projects. 
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Table 11. Project resources (in proportion of GDP) 
 
 2009 2010 2011 
Argentina 0.0093% 0.0104% 0.0114% 
Brazil 0.0018% 0.0018% 0.0020% 
Paraguay 1.0192% 1.0243% 1.7514% 
Uruguay 0.3117% 0.3115% 0.3334% 
SOURCE: Paraguay and Uruguay’s central banks, CEPAL and FOCEM 
 
Overall, Paraguay has the most number of projects (approved, in execution and 
concluded) since the beginning of FOCEM. It has 17, against Uruguay’s 9, Brazil’s 
5 and Argentina’s 3 (see table 12).  
 
 
Table 12. Project distribution (by country, program and resources in US$) 
ARGENTINA Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 1 13,116,511 5,941,008 19,057,519 
Competitiveness Development 1 552,500 119,500 672,000 
Social Cohesion 1 5,212,585 2,721,314 7,933,899 
Total 3 18,881,596 8,781,822 27,663,418 
BRAZIL Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 2 11,021,139 5,102,244 16,123,383 
Competitiveness Development 2 5,809,944 1,791,536 7,601,480 
Social Cohesion 1 17,000,000 5,000,000 22,000,000 
Total 5 33,831,083 11,893,780 45,724,863 
PARAGUAY Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 10 576,827,099 205,049,705 781,876,804 
Competitiveness Development 4 14,322,300 3,751,018 18,073,318 
Social Cohesion 3 20,835,321 9,375,089 30,210,410 
Total 17 611,984,720 218,175,812 830,160,532 
URUGUAY Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 4 141,451,407 52,339,832 193,791,239 
Competitiveness Development 2 4,242,500 1,007,500 5,250,000 
Social Cohesion 3 4,199,799 740,786 4,940,585 
Total 9 149,893,706 54,088,118 203,981.824 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
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The amount of resources transferred to Paraguay reach US$ 611,984,720. In the 
extreme opposite side, Argentina received US$ 18,881,596. In the cases of Brazil, 
Paraguay and Uruguay, the Program of Structural Convergence is responsible for 
most projects. Argentina has one project in each program, but the Structural Con-
vergence one has received the most resources. 
 
 
Table 13. Project distribution (in proportion of the total) 
 
ARGENTINA Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 5.88% 1.77% 2.21% 1.88% 
Competitiveness Development 9.09% 1.20% 0.99% 1.16% 
Social Cohesion 12.50% 11.03% 15.26% 12.19% 
Total 7.69% 2.26% 2.94% 2.44% 
BRAZIL Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 11.76% 2.57% 1.90% 1.59% 
Competitiveness Development 18.18% 12.66% 14.78% 13.11% 
Social Cohesion 12.50% 35.98% 28.03% 33.80% 
Total 12.82% 4.05% 3.99% 4.03% 
PARAGUAY Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 58.82% 77.70% 76.39% 77.35% 
Competitiveness Development 36.36% 31.22% 30.95% 31.16% 
Social Cohesion 37.50% 44.10% 52.56% 46.42% 
Total 43.59% 73.23% 73.12% 73.20% 
URUGUAY Number of projects 
FOCEM  
transfers 
Local  
transfers Total 
Structural Convergence 23.53% 19.05% 19.50% 19.17% 
Competitiveness Development 18.18% 9.25% 8.31% 9.05% 
Social Cohesion 37.50% 8.89% 4.15% 7.59% 
Total 23.08% 17.94% 18.13% 17.99% 
SOURCE: FOCEM <http://www.mercosur.int/focem/> 
 
Proportionally, Paraguay concentrates 43.59% of the number of projects, while 
Argentina has 7.69% (see table 13). If we divide the number of projects by program, 
Paraguay, again, has the biggest proportions in all of the programs, and is accompa-
nied by Uruguay in the Social Cohesion Program. In the Structural Convergence 
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Program, Paraguay’s percentage reaches 58.82%. Uruguay has the second biggest 
proportion in two of the three programs, accompanied by Brazil in the Competitive-
ness Development Program. The Argentinean situation grabs our attention, because 
its fixed percentage of the annual resources is the same as Brazil. Even so, Argenti-
na has the lowest proportion of projects in all the programs, and is only equal to 
Brazil in the Social Cohesion Program, both with 12.5%. In the contributions made 
by FOCEM, the situation changes a bit, with Paraguay still in the lead, pulling the 
biggest share of resources in all programs, but Brazil overtakes Uruguay in two of 
the three (Competitiveness Development and Social Cohesion). On the other hand, 
since these two programs receive less resources than Structural Convergence, 
Uruguay still comes ahead of Brazil, having the second largest share of the total 
contributions from the fund. 
 
 
Table 14. Project distribution (in proportion of GDP) 
 
 Relation between total contribution of 
FOCEM and GDP of 2011 
Argentina 0.0045% 
Brazil 0.0014% 
Paraguay 2.5463% 
Uruguay 0.3247% 
SOURCE: Paraguay and Uruguay’s central banks, CEPAL and FOCEM 
 
In the case of Paraguay, the total amount of contributions from FOCEM repre-
sents 2.5463% of the country’s GDP in 2011 (see table 14). This is a significant 
percentage, regardless of comparisons with other asymmetry reduction or develop-
ment aid mechanisms. Even if one compares it to the EU, the share of FOCEM’s 
transferences in Paraguay’s GDP do not lag too much behind. In 1999, European 
contributions to its smallest economies ―Greece and Portugal― through structural 
and social cohesion funds amounted to 4% of those two countries GDPs (Griffith-
Jones et al., 2003). 
 
 
Conclusions 
 
After five years of functioning, FOCEM has become representative in relation to 
the GDP of its main beneficiary, Paraguay, and to the amount of development aid 
granted by its main contributor, Brazil. Between 2005 and 2009, Brazilian resources 
for this goal amounted to US$ 1,426,250,442.73 (Instituto de Pesquisa Econômica 
Aplicada / Agência Brasileira de Cooperação, 2010). In a smaller timeframe, be-
João Carlos Amoroso Botelho The Reduction of Asymmetries in MERCOSUR 
 
Geopolítica(s)  
2013, vol. 4, núm. 1, 43-62 
59 
tween 2009 and 2012, Brazilian contributions to FOCEM, under the heading of 
resources to international organizations in its budget of development aid, were more 
than half that of the value previous cited, reaching US$ 785,600,000. 
The data presented also show the importance of the resources of FOCEM to Par-
aguay and its efforts to take advantage of them, in times of Paraguayan suspension 
from MERCOSUR, and contradict initial negative evaluations of the fund, which 
emphasized the US$ 100 million mandatory contributions. This paper showed that 
the FOCEM’s resources for projects have been growing every year. The leftovers 
from previous years have also increased, partially explaining the general increase in 
budget, but the main beneficiary of the resources, Paraguay, has also increased its 
efficiency in taping into the funds. The country managed to greatly reduce its lefto-
vers in the 2012 budget, when compared to 2011. The other explanation for the 
increased budget is Brazil’s voluntary contributions. Even if we consider the ex-
traordinary nature of this situation, we are now two years in a row when Brazil has 
transferred additional resources to FOCEM, which may trigger additional voluntary 
transfers, or even an increase in mandatory contributions. 
A decision of CMC from December 2012 even established that the capitalization 
of FOCEM will be considered until the end of 2013. This norm advanced the work 
of evaluating the effectiveness of the fund and the relevance of its continuity, which 
is defined by Decision CMC nº 18/05 for the period of ten years from the first 
contribution. It was still determined the need of a reformulation of the proportions 
of the contributions to FOCEM and benefits received that correspond annually to 
each member state, to account for the new composition of MERCOSUR, with the 
presence of Venezuela, and the possibility of further accessions. 
For the period until the new distribution of contributions and benefits is drafted 
and approved, it was defined a provisional regime for Venezuela. Its annual contri-
bution will be US$ 15.5 million for individual and common projects of other mem-
ber States in the framework of the programs of structural convergence, competi-
tiveness development and social cohesion. There will also be an annual contribution 
of US$ 11.5 million for projects presented by Venezuela itself and the common 
ones with its participation in the framework of the same three programs. Venezue-
lans have then the contribution amount equal to Argentina’s US$ 27 million. The 
difference is that there is a portion allocated exclusively to projects that benefit 
Venezuela, as a way to compensate for the fact that until the adoption of the new 
rules, Venezuelans hardly will benefit from the contributions of other members. 
The series of decisions taken in late 2012 shows the willingness of member 
States of MERCOSUR in valuing FOCEM. Not only the evaluation of the effec-
tiveness and relevance of the fund was anticipated as the consideration of its capi-
talization and the reformulation of the rules of distribution of annual contributions 
and benefits have already been determined, anticipating that the conclusion of the 
evaluation will be the maintenance of the mechanism. 
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Moreover, the justification for the need to reform the rules relies both on the in-
corporation of Venezuela to MERCOSUR, which occurred in 2012, as the possibil-
ity of further accessions. The next is already underway, as Bolivia in 2012 formal-
ized its application for incorporation as a full member, which will now need to be 
ratified by the Parliament of each member State. 
The valuing and reformulation of FOCEM are in line with the strategy of Argen-
tina and Brazil to expand the number of members of MERCOSUR as a way to 
counterbalance the difficulties of deepen integration in terms of rules and policies 
and the increasing trend of trade protectionism among the two powers of the bloc 
since the international economic crisis of 2008. 
However, the expansion of the number of members on the one hand, and the dif-
ficulties in institutional deepening and the protectionist tendency, on the other hand, 
are contradictory movements. If only the first movement persists, it could generate 
a situation in which MERCOSUR customs union reach almost entire South Ameri-
ca and at the same time, stagnate in this stage of integration, which is already im-
perfect, because of exceptions to the Common External Tariff and barriers to prod-
ucts of member countries, or even return to the condition of a free trade zone. 
Beyond these trade issues, the movement to expand the number of members of 
MERCOSUR is not able by itself to lead the integration to other policy areas and 
promote its advancement. In the neofunctionalist terms of Haas (1958; 1964), there 
would be less chance of integration expands from one sector to another, the func-
tional spill-over, starting with issues related to trade liberalization to reach other 
areas. 
There are more questions to be raised. The fund’s impact on the second smallest 
economy of MERCOSUR, Uruguay, amounts to less than 0.5% of the country’s 
GDP in 2011. The persistence of leftovers from previous years is also a problem. In 
the 2012 budget, the leftovers, taking into account non-allocated and non-utilized 
resources, were US$ 376,618,026, which corresponds to almost four times the 
annual mandatory contributions. 
In the Competitiveness Development Program, the preclusion from private com-
panies being completely in charge of projects contradicts the current objective of 
promoting competitive edges in the internal production capabilities of 
MERCOSUR’s countries (Souza, Oliveira and Gonçalves, 2011). If the private 
sector could directly submit their projects and be responsible for the application of 
the resources, the chances of success in promoting regional competitive edges 
would be increased. 
As highlighted, FOCEM is a mechanism aimed at the reduction of structural 
asymmetries. To further deepen the integration process, MERCOSUR still needs to 
address policy asymmetries, which originate themselves from lack of coordination 
and convergence of policies and rules. This kind of asymmetry may also generate 
loss of efficiency, thus hampering the integration process. One alternative is to give 
FOCEM the ability to deal with policy asymmetries such as suggested by Souza, 
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Oliveira and Gonçalves (2011). A way to do so is bind resource transfers to macro-
economic policy goals. In order to work, though, such a mechanism would require 
finessing, both in the definition of requirements and in the construction of a positive 
perception of such measures, under the risk of fuelling nationalistic passions over 
accusations of imperialism against Brazil, such as the ones being directed at Ger-
many in the case of EU. 
A third point is about the possibility of politicization of the project selection pro-
cess, in detriment of technical aspects, since the final decision on approving pro-
jects is made by the CMC, which is composed by the ministers of Economy and the 
chancellors of MERCOSUR’s member States. In 2009, because of a dispute be-
tween Argentina and Uruguay over the installation of papers factories on Uruguay-
an side of the frontier between the two countries, a project that would benefit Uru-
guay, with the construction of power lines between the cities of Candiota, in Brazil, 
and San Carlos, in Uruguay, got vetoed by Argentina on the CMC (Souza, Oliveira 
and Gonçalves, 2011). Having the CMC as an agency responsible for final approval 
gives margin for political rather than technical criteria prevail in the selection 
process. It is important that the main institution of MERCOSUR participate in the 
administration of the fund, so that it can perform accountability over the resources, 
the results achieved and the general compliance of FOCEM with its political objec-
tive of reducing asymmetries and enhancing compromise with the integration 
process. But this is not mean leave to CMC the final word on the approval of pro-
jects. 
The balance of the analysis of FOCEM, then, has two opposite sides. For one, 
the results so far show that the initial negative evaluations were precipitated, be-
cause the fund has become representative in relation to the GDP of its main benefi-
ciary, Paraguay, and to the amount of development aid granted by its main contribu-
tor, Brazil. Moreover, the member states of MERCOSUR have the willingness, as 
suggested by the decisions of the end of 2012, in valuing the role of FOCEM, 
including an increased in the contributions. For the other hand, the fund is still little 
representative for Uruguay, the second smallest economy of MERCOSUR, and 
faces serious institutional challenges, such as the lack of treatment of policy asym-
metries and the possibility of politicization of the decisions. 
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